
































Summary  The article uses different discourses on evil from literature and film to probe 
Derek Edyvane’s political theory that builds a preventive political ethics arguing for “sove-
reignty of evil”. The discussion is limited to a specific evil – violence and violent crime – 
while its essential causes and consequences in nature and society, and the indicated poli-
tics to address it, are subsumed under the term ontology. The underlying idea is that Edy-
vane must first answer more precisely what evil is and how it works in order to make it so-
vereign. Avoiding the consequences of evil and building a political consensus around great 
evils presupposes the understanding of their causes. The method of inquiry that analyses 
fictional material is legitimated by Edyvane’s own employing of art and literature in his 
study, but more importantly, by special quality and insight of classical films and novels that 
make them useful in the exploratory phase of research that procreates hypotheses to be 
tested. After different discourses are explored – ones that see nature, society, politics, or all 
of them, as roots of violent evil and imply different ideas for its control or eradication – and 
Edyvane’s theory is tested against them, a tentative conclusion is reached that political li-
beralism is perhaps the best thing that we have to date.*
Keywords  Edyvane, evil, ontology, political theory, political morality, literature, film, vio-
lence, crime
* The text is based on the presentation “The Sovereignty of Evil” and Ontology of Political Subject: 
Some Examples of the Good, the Bad and the Ugly in Literature and Film, Relevant for Preventive 
Political Morality, held at the symposium Civic Virtue and the Sovereignty of Evil: Political Ethics 
in Uncertain Times in Rijeka on 20th October 2011. I thank all the participants at the symposium 
for the comments and lively discussion on the early draft of this paper, which helped me to im-
prove the written version. As usual, the responsibility for flaws resides within the author, as well 
as the decision to radically reduce the size of the presentation title that somewhat resembled the 
























Introduction: Edyvane’s Political 
Theory and the Ontology of Evil 
In his recent book about the notori-
ous subject, Terry Eagleton bluntly stat-
ed: “The word ‘evil’ is generally a way 
of bringing arguments to an end, like a 
fist in the solar plexus” (Eagleton, 2011: 
16). Luckily enough, when bringing evil 
into political theory, Edyvane in no way 
wants to bring the argument to an end, 
either by anachronistic moralizing or by 
facile demonizing. Instead of that, in the 
manuscript of his new book on civic vir-
tue, he proposes that evil should become 
a “sovereign concept” in our thinking 
about political life, carefully crafting his 
arguments about politics erected around 
that central concept. In other words, evil 
does not serve to end a discussion, but 
to start one.
Edyvane is interested in developing a 
viable contemporary conception of po-
litical morality. Political morality refers 
to a set of guidelines for political think-
ing and acting, which do not necessar-
ily produce a set of precise operational 
rules, but rather serve to provide gener-
al ideas and main directions for collec-
tive decision-making. In thinking about 
political morality, Edyvane adopts a rea-
sonable pluralistic position. Its spirit and 
vocabulary remind one of Isaiah Berlin’s 
thinking about politics. Since there is no 
single final solution to political prob-
lems, Edyvane advises us to discard the 
“dubious monistic model” of political 
morality. However, in making sense of 
our political experience, the general dis-
tinction can be made between preven-
tive and aspirational types of political 
activity. One seeks either to avoid some 
evil or to attain some good. Two types 
of political morality correspond to these 
activities: preventive political morality 
and aspirational political morality. Since 
he is inaugurating evil as “the sovereign 
concept”, Edyvane is, not surprisingly, 
interested in the former.
Developing preventive political mo-
rality is a task for political theory. Poli-
tical theorists should do the conceptual 
work enabling citizens to better under-
stand their political experience and de-
vise a normative framework necessary 
to govern the community in face of chal-
lenges. To be sure, this is in no way an 
exercise in unconstrained normative 
idealism. According to Edyvane, rele-
vant political theory must start from exi-
sting problems and situations in a so-
ciety. And this situation is bleak, if not 
perilous.
Edyvane speaks of “uncertain times” 
and general disappointment in politics 
and civil life which has led many to call 
for fundamental changes in politics and 
stress the importance of restoration of 
civic virtue. But the Edyvanean politi-
cal theorist, working in contemporary 
liberal democratic societies, has to take 
into account the fact of pluralism. As ac-
knowledged by Rawls of Political Liber-
alism, the citizens in a liberal democracy 
are quite far from sharing a single mor-
al vision. Development of any normative 
political theory that properly addres-
ses contemporary political problems has 
to start from the fact of nonexistence of 
overlapping moral consensus. The solu-
tion for Edyvane, then, is not to embark 
on a probably impossible task of finding 
an ideal political theory of aspirational 
morality, but to try to build on the pre-
ventive side of the coin; that is, to start 
from the “sense of the great evils that hu-
mans do” and try to prevent them. This 
sense could be common enough, shared 
by the large majority of citizens, thus en-
abling us to build some kind of widely 























Edyvane’s study – political ethics for un-
certain times.
That conception of political ethics 
requires evil to become the sovereign 
concept, both in political theory and in 
public life (Edyvane, 2012: IV, 20). Edy-
vane sets to develop the normative ideal 
of “austere” public life and politics. How-
ever, he does not devoid his citizens of 
hope – a concept that plays an impor-
tant role in his theory. The body politic 
should be governed according to a mini-
mal consensus on great evils and threats 
perceived by the community, hoping for 
better days to come. Within the frame-
work of preventive political morality, 
not attaining good but preventing evil 
(our new political sovereign) becomes 
civic virtue of today.
The preceding paragraphs give a 
short outline of what I see as Edyvane’s 
very stimulating effort. They also set the 
stage for us to begin a conversation with 
his political theory. In doing so, we will 
focus on the concept of evil. But in what 
sense exactly? In his presentation on 
Edyvane’s manuscript, Elvio Baccarini, 
political philosopher from Rijeka, gave 
a tripartite categorization of possible 
objections to Edyvane’s theory, provid-
ing us with a good starting point for our 
discussion.1 Baccarini’s first objection is 
that sovereign evils are not universally 
felt as such. His second objection is that 
proceduralism is not generally accepted 
as a solution to political problems. The 
third objection states that even if proce-
dure was accepted, it would not guaran-
tee that evils would be cured.
I am not sure that Edyvane’s theory 
can be singularly interpreted as a proce-
1 Elvio Baccarini, Edyvane’s Public Ethics and 
Political Liberalism, Rijeka, 20th October 
2011.
dural political theory, so I am happy to 
focus on the first general critique, which 
I find most interesting.2 It is indeed hard 
to achieve consensus on political good, 
but building politics on a consensus on 
great evils could be an even harder task. 
To give just a few examples: some per-
ceive the death penalty as ultimate evil, 
an illegitimate brutal killing by the hand 
of state, while others see it as a just retri-
bution and a necessary deterrent for the 
gravest of crimes, such as murder.3 Some 
see social policies as a minimal precondi-
tion for decent social life and a good way 
to cure social evils, while other see them 
as intrusions in freedom – the problem 
is that they usually demand taxing of 
the “free market” transactions, and in-
2 Baccarini interprets Edyvane’s theory as an 
example of procedural political ethics, not 
focusing on attaining the good, but on fixing 
the just procedure (roughly stated, if a pro-
cedure is accepted by the parties, then what-
ever comes out of it is, by definition, just and 
must be accepted by the parties). Edyvane 
himself sees his position as procedural and 
defends it as such. But to me it looks much 
richer, or more demanding in the substan-
tial sense. To avoid aspirational ethics and to 
discard the ambitious pursuit of the common 
good can be interpreted as a species of poli-
tical proceduralism, not fixing the outcomes 
in the sense of aspirational morality. How-
ever, we have the idea of evil and the funda-
mental supposition that achieving a rough 
consensus on its sovereignty is possible. In 
that sense, Edyvane’s treatise can be seen as a 
substantial political endeavor, which is not at 
all changed by the fact that this substance is 
“negative” in the sense of seeking evil instead 
of usual searching for the good.
3 The conflict is normative and ideological, 
and as such it is hardly solved by empirical-
ly based arguments, e.g. on statistically mea-
sured effectiveness of the death penalty as a 
























dividual and corporate income – and as 
a breeding ground for perverse incen-
tives of bureaucrats and various “social 
parasites”. Instead of preventing social 
evils, ambitious social policies produce 
new social evils. Finally, some see reli-
gion as an ultimate good and sense pro-
vider in the earthly life of the individual, 
while other see it as a debilitating social 
evil, an opium for the masses, usually 
destructive for social peace and ration-
al conflict solving.4 To cut the long sto-
ry short, developing a viable shared per-
ception of great evils could be a hard nut 
to crack.
But even more importantly, if con-
sensus would be achieved on a pheno-
menon, social practice or object as an 
evil to be avoided by the means of po-
litical action, a further question arises: 
how does that evil come about? For ex-
ample, is violent crime with deathly out-
comes, a hardly disputable great evil, a 
consequence of the evildoer’s free will 
or is it a consequence of social condi-
tions and lousy criminal justice policies, 
or perhaps some other deterministic 
causal factor? The answer to the second 
question obviously determines the defi-
nition of certain socio-political pheno-
mena, actions or institutions as evil, and 
it also determines appropriate politi-
cal means to combat or prevent them. 
Since we have agreed not to cut the dis-
4 Besides drawing a general line between secu-
lar atheists and religious believers, one could 
introduce concrete religious beliefs and in-
stitutionalized religions showing even deep-
er divides and identity clashes, hardly solv-
able by anything that could be pulled out of a 
political theorist’s rich bag of tricks. Among 
many other possible examples, the postco-
lonial partition of India and contemporary 
Bosnia and Herzegovina could offer a rich 
historic-political insight into the problem.
cussion short by hitting the solar plexus, 
we should, for a clearer idea of what is 
at stake with Edyvane’s political theory, 
conduct a short inquiry into the concept 
of evil. To use a bit more technical term 
from the history of philosophy and to-
day’s meta-theoretical discussions in so-
cial sciences, we should define more pre-
cisely the ontology of evil, i.e. understand 
its main traits, reasons, causes and possi-
bilities defining it as, or making it “evil”. 
A few preliminary disclaimers and clari-
fications are necessary.
The term ontology is not used with 
mystifying pretensions of grasping the 
fundamental depth of being that could 
be hiding behind the orthography of the 
word we chose to highlight. This essay is 
not a phenomenological exercise in fun-
damental analytics of being in the world 
(e.g. Heidegger, 1985: 9, 14; Sutlić, 1989: 
71). Nor does it owe any debts, in terms 
of precise hermeneutics, to the recog-
nized traditions and authors of the on-
tological enquiries from the history of 
philosophy. I simply use the term as it 
is today commonly used in meta-theore-
tical language of mainstream globalized 
political science (e.g. Marsh and Fur-
long, 2002). It denotes entities or, to put 
it more metaphorically, “building blocks” 
a theory presupposes: (sometimes com-
plicated) social and political entities are 
taken to exist “down there” in the world, 
thus making an essential ingredient of 
the developed system of elementary ca-
tegories in a theory. For example, for ra-
tional choice theory in economics and 
political science these blocks are utility 
maximizing individuals, and for a more 
or less orthodox variant of Marxism, 
these are economic classes. These enti-
ties have logic, causes and consequen-
ces, and certain motives and interests if 























logy here means not intuitively grasped 
fundamental essence, but more of a firm 
and clear theoretical conception expli-
cating the elementary functioning of the 
analyzed phenomenon.
The alternative way to look at it – 
perhaps more controversial, but more 
familiar to the traditional canons of po-
litical theory; perhaps narrower, but very 
illuminating, especially in the discussion 
on evil – is to evoke Carl Schmitt’s trea-
tise The Concept of the Political. In the 
seventh chapter, Schmitt stated that eve-
ry political theory and idea presupposes 
a certain anthropology. The controver-
sy here is not in Schmitt’s Nazi allegian-
ces, but in his insistence on the state-
ment that all “genuine political theories” 
see man as evil, in the sense that he is 
dangerous and unpredictable (Schmitt, 
1996: 58-68).5 A fundamental picture of 
the subject that fuels political theory – 
its fundamental anthropological “belief ” 
– is important because it can serve to 
draw a fundamental distinction between 
various political theories and ideolo-
gies. In that sense, for example, the dis-
tinction between Left and Right can be 
seen as a distinction between proposing 
anarchism and believing in authority: 
while Left ultima linea believes that po-
litical authority interfering in the social 
sphere, as a potential sphere of freedom 
of the individuals,6 induces all kinds of 
5 Leo Strauss elaborated much on this theme 
in the review of Schmitt’s treatise in Archiv 
für Sozialwissenschaft... (Strauss, 2001a) 
and in the subsequent short letter he sent to 
Schmitt (Strauss, 2001b).
6 The Latin qualification is inserted to suggest 
that this (Schmittian-Straussian) distinction 
between Left and Right perhaps applies only 
if one has in mind the final temporal stage 
of societal development, or logically postu-
evil, Right espouses a strong belief that 
man is more or less naturally evil, i.e. 
dangerous and inclined to violence, and 
thus has to be subject to political author-
ity. Depending on the conception of the 
human subject, the presence of authori-
ty, or precisely the opposite – its absence 
– produces evil. Either way, the ontolo-
gy of the subject shapes the fundamental 
logic of a political theory.
The idea in this essay is, then, to 
probe a bit deeper into the fundamental 
concepts behind Edyvane’s theory in or-
der to get a clearer view of the ontology 
of evil that should be informing or legit-
imating the political “institution” of so-
vereignty of evil. If evil is to be our sove-
reign, than we should understand it bet-
ter. The ontology of evil is a term mark-
ing our attempt to acquire its precise 
understanding or to grasp it more tho-
roughly. The attempt is not constrained 
only on the “anthropological” question 
on subjects (it does not necessarily posit 
in advance that individual subjects are at 
all important for evil: it could be “soci-
lates a perfect communist society, where ide-
al social conditions enable true freedom, and 
human subjects, not being evil as such, act 
peacefully towards one another, without co-
ercion of the state which has withered away. 
In the historical meantime, the Rousseauist 
coercing of the subject to be free and revolu-
tionary collective action in the Marxist tra-
dition (or simply and more mundanely: so-
cialism administered by the state) are more 
naturally labeled as “leftist”, while the above 
formulations on freedom are more easily as-
sociated with Ayn Rand’s or Nozick’s liberal-
ism or anarchocapitalism, which are usual-
ly understood as something on the “Right”. 
Anyway, the precise application of estab-
lished historical labels is not of the essence 
for our understanding of ontology and its ap-
























ety”, not “anthropology”). The scope of 
ontology is a bit wider: when searching 
for the theoretical core, the important 
ontological questions seek to find out 
what are the causes and consequences of 
evil; what kind of subjects, institutions 
or, more generally, entities are involved; 
what kind of actions, motives, causal or 
moral mechanisms of evildoing are we 
dealing with? Generally, the question is 
how and why evil comes about and what 
to do about it? If we were to sum up the 
idea of our effort into an aphorism, we 
should say: first ontology, and only then 
– political theory.
Eagleton’s witty remark is thus again 
to the point. Its normative implications 
for political theorists, coming from the 
unsaid but intended, strongly suggest 
the importance of an ontological hunt 
that must be prior to political solutions. 
The posited verbum interius, of course, 
receives its explicit elaboration in the 
rest of Eagleton’s book. According to 
Eagleton, evil is an important concept, 
not at all something to be discarded. We 
have to know what it is and how it comes 
about, and, not surprisingly, different 
people tend to give different answers to 
these questions. For example, when the 
array of interesting but not always dis-
ciplined associations, sharp and witty 
remarks7 finally comes to a conclusion, 
7 The “Žižekian” style has become a good sell-
ing commodity in contemporary theoreti-
cal production aiming for the wider audi-
ence, at least in scholarship in cultural stud-
ies and literary criticism, which could in its 
major part perhaps be politically subsumed 
under the label of Postmodern Left. For 
whether this theoretically and/or politically 
applies to Eagleton’s works, cf. his definition 
of postmodernism in After Theory (Eagle-
ton, 2005: 20). To anticipate the discussion 
in the main section of the essay, for Žižek’s 
Eagleton speaks of “authentic material-
ism” aware of the limitations of moral 
actions. Since moral actions depend on 
the “material”, i. e. socioeconomic con-
text, the roots of evil can be traced in 
the social context. Unlike the proverbi-
al British people evoked by Eagleton, the 
average man does not display virtue un-
der pressure: human beings are mixed, 
“morally hybrid” creatures. Accordingly, 
the biggest evil does not come from evil 
individuals, but from institutions, vest-
ed interests and “anonymous processes” 
(cf. Eagleton, 2011: 156, 160). Like chil-
dren, those who are materially deprived 
and uneducated cannot be evil. The so-
ciety is to blame for their evil deeds, so 
societal change is indicated to combat 
evil.
It can become much more compli-
cated than what this more or less tradi-
tional position on the Left suggests, un-
own position on violence, cf. Žižek (2008), 
where he discards the juxtaposition of blam-
ing the human nature for violence against in-
justices of society, and instead speaks of the 
truly violent “nature” of competitive capital-
ism that produces violence (ibid.: 82). On the 
other hand, Žižek’s own ontological position 
is that nature is chaotic: “Nature brings no 
equilibrium (...) Nature is one big catastro-
phe”, but from which he metaphysically ex-
cludes humans, who are, according to Sartre, 
whom Žižek paraphrases, “radically con-
demned to freedom” (Nedjeljom u 2 [Sun-
day at Two, A Croatian National TV Sun-
day Talk Show], 2007, part 3 of 7 parts avail-
able at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v= 
tV1aSNzh7xU&feature=related). In the book 
on violence, Žižek gives a strikingly honest 
description of his authorial technique: “It 
would be all too easy to score points in this 
debate using witty reversals which can go 
on indefinitely” (Žižek, 2008: 99; translation 
taken from the English version of the book 























ambiguously tracing the causes of evil in 
unjust society and giving limited autono-
my to moral actions of the individuals. 
A good illustration of this (and an early 
hint of our method) can be found in Fritz 
Lang’s classic thriller film M from 1931 
that tackles the problem of evil. The film 
tells the tale of a compulsive serial killer 
of young girls, perhaps a pedophile, who 
is finally caught in orchestrated action of 
“normal” criminals (smugglers, thieves, 
pimps, etc.), irritated by police pressure 
and the bad name that the vicious killer 
gives to all the “decent criminals”. He is 
judged in front of the crime syndicate, 
in a lynching atmosphere, and saved by 
the police in the last moment. In a con-
vincing monologue, the murderer Hans 
Beckert, played by Peter Lorre, claims he 
cannot constrain himself no matter how 
hard he tries. The criminals, knowing 
that Beckert will ultimately be released 
from some prison hospital and that he 
will kill again, think that the only solu-
tion is to kill him on the spot. However, 
his “lawyer”, provided by the criminals 
in order to imitate a fair trial and the due 
process of law, accuses them for hypo-
crisy (the criminal boss presiding the 
trial is himself wanted for three mur-
ders), and claims that the fact Beckert 
cannot help himself is the precise rea-
son why he must not be killed. He is not 
responsible for his deeds, so he should 
not be punished. The final scene stops 
before the sentence on the regular trial 
by the state is pronounced. Instead of the 
judge’s sentence, the message is directed 
to the viewers: all of us should take bet-
ter care of our children.
In Lang’s film we can see all the in-
tricacies of interpretation. They open in 
front of us in both dimensions, of social 
diagnostics and political prescriptions. 
On the one side – let us label this po-
sition Left – we could speak of a hypo-
critical society seeking scapegoats for 
its own fallacies. The killer is but one of 
the lost and alienated children, perhaps 
a patient to be cured. On the other side 
– we can call it Right – the killer is na-
turally evil. He cannot help it but to kill 
young girls: it is in his nature. Wheth-
er he is morally guilty or not is beside 
the point: just retribution and protection 
of society demand punishment, and the 
cheapest solution in utilitarian terms is 
simply to take his life, while treatment is 
costly, dubious in terms of success, and 
with a high chance of recidivism.
We do not need to resolve the para-
doxes of M here. For now, the Lang ex-
ample serves us to suggest that truth in 
these matters is – if it is at all “out there” 
– hard to find, and that evil and policies 
to counter it are a slippery terrain for 
political theory. When one builds a po-
litical theory of preventive morality, one 
should take this into account and de-
velop a clear theoretical picture of evil’s 
functioning in order to form a theoreti-
cal basis for policies to tackle it, within 
the framework of adequate political mo-
rality. The idea of this text is to provide 
some conjectures useful for building a 
clearer picture of how evil works in a 
specific area of human activity to which 
the term is perhaps most legitimately ap-
plied. Probing Edyvane’s theory through 
a different lens on the functioning of evil 
will pose some interesting questions to 
his theory and provide at least some pro-
visory and sketchy suggestions on how 
to answer these questions. The specific 
way I am going to do it, foreshadowed 
in the title and in the Fritz Lang exam-
ple (“method”), and the specific area of 
“evil” I am going to focus on (“subject 
matter”), require a double warrant. This 
























section, defining the terrain for concrete 
analyses in the second part of the essay.
In the analysis, I am going to use dif-
ferent examples from literature and film 
that give causal explanations of violence 
and sometimes offer political prescrip-
tions to cope with it. Why research fic-
tion and not the “truth”? Fiction spe-
culates on the ontology of evil in many 
interesting and non-trivial ways. First, 
it is legitimate to expose Edyvane’s the-
ory to this kind of test since his own me-
thod is to use a wide array of creative 
ideas from fiction to build and enrich 
his political theory. In the introduction 
to the manuscript, Edyvane states that he 
will use “the insights from art and litera-
ture” and he does so, using various ma-
terial: it can be some fine grained skepti-
cal insight from Montaigne’s Essays, the 
idea of hope from Cormac McCarthy’s 
The Road, or an interpretation of Goya’s 
grotesque pilgrims from A Pilgrimage to 
San Isidro, an early 19th century paint-
ing. This justification can be extend-
ed further. In his presentation in Rije-
ka, Edyvane confessed that although his 
book is not a book on Stuart Hampshire, 
a figure of this late Oxford philosopher 
“looms large” in it. This is indeed so, and 
it offers an additional warrant for our 
method of inquiry. In the fourth chap-
ter of the manuscript, Edyvane exten-
sively discusses Hampshire’s ideas from 
Justice Is Conflict, quoting him that “an 
understanding of human nature... is best 
achieved... through the study of human 
feelings as expressed in history, litera-
ture and personal experience”, and stat-
ing (not surprising for a reader of Mon-
taigne8) that such a study could “reveal 
8 Prior to the symposium in Rijeka, Edyvane 
held a lecture in Zagreb on 18th October. The 
lecture, entitled Rejecting Society: Friendship, 
an array of diverse and often clashing 
virtues and moral aspirations” as well as 
“certain rough patterns and regularities” 
(Edyvane, 2012: IV, 17).
Hampshire’s position is not just an 
additional ad hominem ornament to 
our warrant. It is interesting because it 
strongly suggests there is some inher-
ent quality in art and literature for hu-
man understanding, which in turn 
suggests they are often too easily for-
mally subsumed under the label of fic-
tional accounts. No matter how exactly 
we decide to label them, it is out of the 
question that they bring us better un-
derstanding of different problems in so-
cial sciences and political theory. One 
could here evoke the old 19th century 
idea that human sciences in the wid-
est sense (Geisteswissenschaften) cannot 
copy the methods of natural sciences. 
It is a theme that is classically explored 
in Gadamer’s hermeneutics (Gadamer, 
1978: 1-25).9 Knowledge is perhaps ob-
tained not through blind obedience to 
methodological canons, but has much 
more to do with “psychological subtle-
ness” (cf. Grondin, 1999: 23 et passim). 
Without any doubt, art and literature are 
an important factor in building these 
faculties and acquiring insights.
Society and Montaigne, explored the political 
potentials of misanthropy.
9 Gadamer claims that historical understand-
ing precedes any discussion of usefulness or 
effectiveness of formal scientific methods, 
be it methods of natural sciences or herme-
neutics in the sense of, for example, philo-
logical or theological hermeneutics, i.e. some 
kind of narrow scholarly art and craft of un-
derstanding (cf. Gadamer, 1978: 23). Never-
theless, that does in no way mean that me-
thodical and precise work in human sciences 
is not important, even for Gadamer. On the 























The other, more mundane way to put 
it is that good fiction usually builds on 
strong personal experience, perceptive 
talent, thorough research and prepara-
tory work done by the author. It can thus 
present some real problems of society 
and politics, including the problems of 
evil deeds, relevant for political theory, 
and it can often do it better than some 
dry scientific compendium or methodo-
logically correct but shallow or irrele-
vant research. Finally, when speaking 
about this matter, one must not forget 
the “magic” expressive element of fic-
tion, one that is hard to explain ration-
ally. Doris Lessing, the 2007 Nobel lau-
reate in literature, writing the first tome 
of her autobiography, somewhat disap-
pointedly concluded that her autobio-
graphy is perhaps inferior to her liter-
ary magnum opus The Golden Notebook. 
Her statement applies to the works we 
use here as material for detecting prob-
lems: “I have to conclude that fiction is 
better at ‘the truth’ than a factual record. 
Why this should be so is a very large 
subject and one I don’t begin to under-
stand” (Lessing, 2008a: ix).10
10 Aside of much else that it does, Lessing’s 
Golden Notebook perhaps gives better in-
sight into the “intellectual and moral cli-
mate” on the Left after the Second World War 
than many, if not all, historical investigations 
of the theme. The same goes for the read-
ing of Stendhal’s and Tolstoy’s works, which 
give excellent insight in 19th century France 
and Russia: “To read Red and Black, and Lu-
cien Leuwen is to know that France as if one 
were living there, to read Ana Karenina is to 
know that Russia” (Lessing, 2008b: xv). Even 
if this statement sounds naïve and overcon-
fident (in the elementary Cartesian sense, 
one might ask: How do you know, without a 
clear methodological check? Why should we 
believe your claim?), I am prepared to take 
Of course, the common sense and 
general methodological decency of sci-
ence oblige us to provide a short cave-
at, concluding the discussion of our first 
warrant: the idea is not to glorify “fic-
tion over truth”, but to use fiction in an 
intelligent way to get us to the core of 
the problems. Interesting discursive re-
flections clad in nice aesthetics, built on 
personal experiences and ruminations 
of finer spirits, often show us the core 
of the problem, possible causes and con-
sequences of the phenomenon, and give 
clues for political theory. This is simply 
the Popperian “it does not matter where 
it springs from” complex of discovery, 
not the complex of testing an idea that 
principally demands firmer methodo-
logical rules for falsification. In this 
phase, we are using creative insights to 
ask questions and provide preliminary 
answers and suggestions for theorizing 
and “further research”. Without this ca-
veat, it could be just fiction.
The second warrant explains why 
I chose to focus on the specific area of 
evildoing to illustrate the problems of 
the ontology of evil. I must admit that I 
cannot be sure if my discussion applies 
to other social evils or even if one can 
speak of a general ontology of evil. I don’t 
want to make such ambitious claims, but 
I am certain that even the discussion in 
this narrow area will provide very useful 
insights to those who eventually wish to 
the risk of being unscientific, at least in this 
initial exploratory phase. As economist and 
political scientist Charles Lindblom rightly 
stated not so long ago, highlighting differ-
ent ideological and methodological limita-
tions of social sciences, the scope of probing 
in our “troubled attempt to understand and 
shape society” should not be too constrained, 
in order to avoid impairment in our thinking 
























explore a general ontology of evil. The 
reasons for this narrow focus stem from 
my particular research interests. I de-
fended my PhD thesis on politics and 
violent crime in Croatia chronologically 
situated in the twenty years period be-
ginning with Croatia’s gaining of inde-
pendence. This part of my research built 
a historical and comparative framework 
for understanding violent crime and po-
litical violence. The framework included 
a wide exploration of the theme of vio-
lence in literature and film.11 I see part of 
that research to be relevant in discussing 
Edyvane’s theory.
Without much hesitation, violent 
crime can be called evil. People beat-
ing and killing each other, sometimes 
for political reasons and within politi-
cal structures – state or non-state, for-
mal or informal – breach the old ideal 
of peaceful social contract and the state’s 
monopoly of force under the rule of law. 
Violence challenges the elementary pre-
suppositions for decent life in a society. 
When violence escalates, it all goes down 
to Hobbes again. Violence, or more spe-
cifically “violent crime”, is an evil, then, 
although a specific one. Among innu-
merous examples of different fictional 
discursive depictions of this problem, its 
causes and solutions, together forming 
11 In the framework of research on penal po-
licy and violent crime, this research theme 
can be justified with the help of Nils Chris-
tie, famous Norwegian criminologist and liv-
ing institution of leftist discourse on penal 
policy. According to Christie, the image of 
man comes from different discursive sour-
ces (no doubt including literature and film): 
“Our criminal policies influence our images 
of man: how he is, how he ought to be. But 
our images of man – brought to us from other 
sources – do also set standards for criminal 
policies” (Christie, 1986: 105).
an ontology of violent evil, I chose about 
half a dozen examples, showcasing some 
“patterns and regularities” which inter-
est Hampshire and Edyvane. These are, 
I think, the paradigmatic cases relevant 
in discussion of Edyvane’s theory, cho-
sen from the field that is just short of im-
mense.12
12 The accounts of violent crime in literature 
range from fatal and apolitical pictures of the 
violent subject, given in Camus’ Stranger or 
Genet’s Miracle of a Rose, to Vian’s surreal-
ist and ironic provocations in The Ants; from 
Kafka’s ideas on violence performed by a de-
personalized bureaucracy in The Process and 
The Castle or by a punishing machine of his 
baroque story In the Penal Colony, to spe-
cifically political causes of violence and suf-
fering in Solzhenitsyn’s One Day in the Life 
of Ivan Denisovitch or Orwell’s totalitarian 
dystopia 1984; from the evils of society por-
trayed in Dickens’ Oliver Twist or Hugo’s Les 
Misérables, where crime and violence stem 
from poor living conditions of the work-
ing class, to the evils of nature in Bulga-
kov’s The Fatal Eggs or Golding’s Lord of the 
Flies. The same discursive and political diver-
sity is caught in film, ranging from Gavras’ 
and Haneke’s films (e.g. Z, Caché, Das weisse 
Band) to films by Peckinpah, Boorman or 
Milius (Straw Dogs, Conan, Zardoz and De-
liverance), Lars von Trier (Dogville, The Anti-
christ) or Kubrick (The Clockwork Orange). I 
discuss some of these in detail in the second 
part of the essay. Although that would be in 
spirit of Edyvane’s research, I decided to ex-
clude other forms of art because that would 
stretch our story too much, making the pool 
of material from which we would have to 
choose not only short of immense, but liter-
ally short of infinite: in tracing the ontology 
of evil in the field of violent crime and penal 
policy one could, for example, interpret Van 
Gogh’s La ronde des prisonniers (The Round 
of the Prisoners) from 1890 (cf. Rivera Beiras, 
2005: 167), similarly to the way Edyvane uses 























The Ontology of Evil in Literature 
and Film: Society, Nature, Reform, 
and Repression
A. Society and Reform
We can build from simpler to more 
complex positions. Thus a good starting 
place for probing Edyvane’s theory with 
different ontologies of evil is the naïve 
position on the Left. At least in literary 
criticism, this naiveté is admitted. Ironi-
cally, the genre that depicts society and 
its ills, “socialist realism”, is not realist 
at all. Its function is political: its role is 
to take part in all-encompassing revolu-
tionary struggle. The Wikipedian defini-
tion is formidably pregnant and precise 
here: “Socialist realism is a teleological-
ly-oriented style having its purpose the 
furtherance of the goals of socialism 
and communism”.13 The novel Mother 
written by Maxim Gorky in the begin-
ning of the 20th century is a good exam-
ple of that “teleogical” discourse where 
a strong sense of political purpose pre-
-shapes the diagnosis. In the first chap-
ter of the novel, Gorky draws a firm 
connection between hard and desperate 
lives of the working class on the turn of 
the century and their inclination to vio-
lence, which is in no way instrumental, 
but only serves as a relief for their point-
less existence. The factory is used as a 
The Eternaut, exploring the violent state of 
nature (Oesterheld and López, 2008); or ana-
lyze songs, spanning from Bob Dylan’s po-
litically engaged Only a Pawn in their Game, 
about the racist social structures and politics 
ultimately responsible for the shooting of a 
civil rights activist, to The Pogues’ depressive 
and fatalistic Hell’s Ditch that uses the allego-
ry of the rose for a killer, making explicit re-
ferences to Genet’s book.
13 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Socialist_real-
ism
picturesque metonym for the brutalities 
of capitalism and the social miseries of 
the working men: 
Every day the factory whistle bellowed 
forth its shrill, roaring, trembling 
noises into the smoke-begrimmed 
and greasy atmosphere of the work-
ingmen’s suburb; and obedient to 
the summons of the power of steam, 
people poured out of gray houses (...) 
The day was swallowed up by the fac-
tory; the machine sucked out of men’s 
muscles as much vigor as it needed 
(Gorky, 1907, Ch. 1). 
The causal chain in the first chapter 
consists of a few precise interconnected 
segments: “the accumulated exhaustion” 
deprives workers of their appetite; “ex-
hausted with toil” they drink; they drink 
lots of vodka; they beat their wives and 
children, they fight among themselves, 
sometimes killing each other. This all af-
fects the children, which are socialized 
into this pointless and violent existence:
This lurking malice steadily in-
creased, inveterate as the incura-
ble weariness in their muscles. They 
were born with this disease of the 
soul inherited from their fathers. 
Like a black shadow it accompa-
nied them to their graves, spurring 
on their lives of crime, hideous in its 
aimless cruelty and brutality (ibid.).
Unless political struggle changes 
things, constant and pointless drunken-
ness and violence appears as “perfectly 
legitimate”: “Life had always been like 
that. It flowed on monotonously and 
slowly somewhere down the muddy, 
turbid stream, year after year...” (ibid.).
Our focus here is not political, so it 
is of less importance if we take the of-
fered ontology of violence produced by 
























piction seeking revolution or as a cari-
cature of the past, meaning that capital-
ism is a lesser evil that can be cured by 
workings of social democracy and its so-
cial policies, which long ago curbed the 
extreme versions of (19th century) capi-
talism. The ontology is the same in both 
variants and their political prescriptions: 
violence comes from society and can be 
best cured by inducing changes in soci-
ety by the means of social policy, not by 
the narrow measures of criminal justice 
policy-making.
Accepting this ontology of evil opens 
some questions for Edyvane. If austerity 
is the virtue for governing the public life 
in liberal democracies – political theo-
ry in the Edyvanean framework must 
more or less take these for granted and 
exclude the possibility of revolutionary 
struggle – and if political ethics is to be 
preventive, can evil be cured or amend-
ed? In the fourth chapter of the manu-
script, Edyvane writes of sovereign evil 
as something quite narrow. Sovereign 
evils are “perennial” evils, experienced 
as such immediately “by any normal-
ly responsive person”. We can put aside 
the question of how much politics and 
different ideological inclinations make a 
concept of normal person useful in po-
litical theory – as we have mentioned in 
the introduction, a consensus could be 
very hard to reach on the sovereignty 
of evil – but nonetheless, this narrow-
er conception would not allow for cur-
ing much of the evil in the framework 
of a “socialist” ontology of evil. Starva-
tion is a sovereign evil, but the problem 
of Gorky’s workers is poverty and un-
fair toil, which are not perceived as evil 
by “any normally responsive person”. In 
this sense, narrowly conceived preven-
tive ethics would not allow for much po-
litical action in amending evils. 
On the other hand, there is a differ-
ent aspect of austerity ethics presented 
in Edyvane’s manuscript. If I understand 
him correctly, he speaks affirmatively of 
post Second World War (British) wel-
farism. This opens a possibility for a 
wider conception of sovereign evil: so-
cial policies, such as public health sys-
tem and social insurance open to all ci-
tizens, and regulatory policies, such as 
statal control of the banks and the mar-
ket system, could be subsumed under 
the wider umbrella of preventive ethics. 
But then it could turn out that there are 
two Edyvanes and that sovereign evil is 
a bit more specific, and consequently – 
not sovereign.
B. Nature and (Impossibility of) Reform
But should we accept this ontology 
that is so problematic for Edyvane? The 
question is whether evil, in its essential 
part, is produced by society or not? If un-
just society really produces evil, than pre-
ventive ethics gives too little and comes 
too late. This perennial question is not to 
be conclusively answered here but, luck-
ily for Edyvane, there is very probably 
much more to violent crime – perhaps 
a symptom and a symbol of evil – than 
provided by the discourse of Gorky’s so-
cialist realism and its lighter versions. 
Our second excerpt comes from roughly 
the same time, but the position of this 
author is opposite. Dostoyevsky’s Crime 
and Punishment from the second half 
of the 19th century speaks of psycholo-
gy or, more generally, nature as the root 
cause of evil. For us, the interesting mo-
ment in the novel is not the relatively ba-
nal deed, but the discourse surrounding 
it. The killing of an old evil usurer and 
her half-sister gets the plot going, but 
the discussions the killer, Raskolnikov, 























tor, Porfiry Petrovitch, together with his 
friend, Razumikhin, is the literary place 
where the discourse on evil and cau-
ses of crime comes to prominence. Dos-
toyevsky’s message is that socialism does 
not cure the problems of human nature 
responsible for evil deeds. Not the facto-
ry, a metonym for capitalism successful-
ly producing evils, but the phalanstery, 
a metaphor for socialism unsuccessfully 
curing evils, is used in the following ex-
cerpt to pinpoint the problems of naïve 
socialist ideas on preventing evils:
I am not wrong. I’ll show you their 
pamphlets. Everything with them is 
“the influence of environment”, and 
nothing else. Their favorite phrase! 
From which it follows that, if soci-
ety is normally organized, all crime 
will cease at once, since there will 
be nothing to protest against and all 
men will become righteous in one in-
stant. Human nature is not taken into 
account, it is excluded, it’s not sup-
posed to exist! They don’t recognize 
that humanity, developing by a his-
torical living process, will become at 
last a normal society, but they believe 
that a social system that has come out 
of some mathematical brain is going 
to organize all humanity at once and 
make it just and sinless in an instant, 
quicker than any living process! (...) 
And it comes in the end to their re-
ducing everything to the building of 
walls and the planning of rooms and 
passages in a phalanstery! The pha-
lanstery is ready, indeed, but your 
human nature is not ready for the 
phalanstery – it wants life (...) You 
can’t skip over nature by logic (Dos-
toyevsky, 1866, Part III, Ch. 5).
The part is spoken in conversation 
by Razumikhin who “interrupted with 
heat” to explain how one cannot put 
“the whole secret of life in two pages of 
print” (ibid.). The symbols in the names 
are clear, at least to the speakers of Slavic 
languages (such as Croatian): the trou-
bled killer’s name Raskolnikov connotes 
problems of psychology, nature and loss 
of control (raskol literary meaning di-
vide), while Razumikhin’s name is a 
strong positive signifier (razum means 
reason) and associates the quoted mes-
sage with reasonableness and prudence. 
The final shocking example, serving to 
support the idea that nature is the cause 
of problems, also comes from Razu-
mikhin, who asks how one can blame 
society when a forty year old man rapes 
a ten year old girl, a theme that is also 
explored in Dostoyevsky’s later novel 
Demons,14 and that brings us back to 
Lang’s Beckert, where we started.
But if the problem is in nature, what 
can be done by politics? If for the first 
ontology Edyvane’s position does not do 
enough, for this one it cannot do enough, 
if anything at all? Preventive ethics won’t 
do much to stop Raskolnikov from kill-
ing the evil granny. If socialism does not 
cure evil, liberal democracy certainly 
does no better job. The Edyvanean li-
beral political theory is agnostical in the 
matters of human nature; it cannot in-
terfere in the private sphere of the indi-
vidual, who must first commit a violent 
crime for the state to react. Liberal pre-
ventive ethics starts from given natures 
of its subjects. Nature is the source of 
evil and moral advance, if one can speak 
of such a thing, is at best very slow and 
fickle. Consensus is reached, but liberal 
preventive ethics can only react to evil 
14 Stavrogin, the central character in Demons, 
rapes a young girl who commits suicide. He 

























things which are out of its control. With-
in this framework, evil is the sovereign, 
but a poor one.
C. Society and Nature: 
A Double Reform?
But what if evil is the product both of 
bad society and bad nature? This is the 
position taken by Aldous Huxley in his 
utopian novel The Island from the early 
sixties. Defining the spirit of the decade, 
the novel portrays a utopian political 
community located on the island of Pala 
where subjects live a peaceful and hap-
py life, enriched with different self-ful-
filling experiences. Blessings of Western 
science and technology are combined 
with Eastern thinking and holistic spiri-
tual doctrines. The economy is not in-
dustrial. The environment is preserved, 
while technology is applied in a control-
led and limited manner. Huxley’s ec-
lectic New Age heaven brings a unique 
ritual of initiation to higher spheres of 
perception: Pala subjects develop their 
spirituality by taking moksha, a psyche-
delic drug fabricated from mushrooms.
The peaceful utopia cannot survive 
in a belligerent surrounding, and so the 
Palanese society ultimately falls victim to 
a military defeat. However, discussions 
between Will Farnaby, a shipwrecked 
journalist who enthusiastically explores 
the Palanese society, and Pala’s inhabit-
ants, especially Dr. Robert, grandson of 
Dr. Andrew MacPhail, a Scottish physi-
cian who co-founded Pala, reveal how 
Pala is, internally, almost literally devoid 
of violence. From violence in the fami-
ly and violent crimes by petty criminals 
to war crimes orchestrated by ambitious 
political leaders, ontological rumina-
tions from Huxley’s Island portray vi-
olence as stemming from mankind’s 
yearning for power and domination. 
The problem for Huxley’s Dr. Robert is 
that all small-scale and large-scale, poli-
tical and non-political “tyrants and sad-
ists” – all the frustrated “power-loving 
troublemakers” are not curbed and re-
formed early enough in their lives. To-
gether with society, politics, morals and 
culture of the West, these violent actors 
produce a spiral chain of suffering. The 
evil is written both in the human nature 
and in the structure of society, which 
enables human nature to develop its de-
structive potentials to the fullest.
Since there are two fundamental 
types of violent subjects, “two distinct 
and dissimilar species – the Muscle Peo-
ple and the Peter Pans”, two different 
strategies of violence prevention are em-
ployed in the ideal Palanese society. The 
Peter Pans, immature romantics who 
want to compensate their inferiority 
complex with excesses of power (Hux-
ley’s ultimate example is Hitler), are 
dealt with by the means of “early diagno-
sis and three pink capsules a day before 
meals”. Jail sentences, psychoanalysis and 
psychiatry are no solution for Dr. Rob-
ert; neither are moralistic Christian ser-
mons: “Words about sibling rivalry and 
hell and the personality of Jesus are no 
substitutes for biochemistry”. The Mus-
cle Men (the ultimate example is Stalin) 
are, however, “as muscular” and “just as 
tramplingly extraverted” on Pala. Their 
lust for power is controlled by Palanese 
societal and political arrangements; it is 
deflected “from people and on to things”. 
While it would perhaps be a simplifying 
overstatement to say that a potential to-
talitarian dictator becomes a lumber-
jack, Huxley’s utopian social reformers 
offer no doubt about the success of the 
Palanese social experiment: “A crop of 
potential failures and criminals, poten-























anthropes and revolutionaries for revo-
lution’s sake, has been transformed into 
a crop of useful citizens who can be go-
verned adandena asatthena – without 
punishment and without a sword”. The 
following passage sums up Dr. Robert’s 
lengthy discourse and gives the essential 
contours of Huxley’s ontology of violent 
evil, focusing, interestingly enough in 
our context, on a classical liberal thinker 
who theorized on power:
That was Acton’s fatal weakness. As 
a political theorist he was altogether 
admirable. As a practical psycholo-
gist he was almost nonexistent. He 
seems to have thought that the pow-
er problem could be solved by good 
social arrangements, supplement-
ed, of course, by sound morality and 
a spot of revealed religion. But the 
power problem has its roots in ana-
tomy and biochemistry and tempera-
ment. Power has to be curbed on the 
legal and political levels; that’s obvi-
ous. But it’s also obvious that there 
must be prevention on the indivi-
dual level. On the level of instinct and 
emotion, on the level of the glands 
and the viscera, the muscles and the 
blood (Huxley, 1962: 189).
The passage points to another limi-
tation in prevention of evil we are faced 
with if we accept Edyvane’s understand-
ing of political theory. Huxley is warning 
us that the narrow liberal conception of 
political theory and sovereignty of evil 
will not produce an effective solution. 
We will return to this theme in the con-
clusion, employing our most pessimistic 
fictional forces, but here it is worth not-
ing that liberal political theory, tailored 
to the existent liberal democracies and 
the fact of pluralism, could not be good 
enough for solving or at least ameliorat-
ing the problem of evil. In the utopian 
framework of Huxley’s Island, diminish-
ing violence requires not only total refor-
mation of society, politics and ideology, 
but determined imposition of behavio-
ral patterns to subjects, perhaps even in-
voluntary tinkering with biochemistry. 
While Dostoyevsky stops at diagnosing 
that the problem is in nature and that 
naïvely conceived socialist reforms do 
not work, Huxley is much more ambi-
tious: he demands a total change of soci-
ety and nature. That is deeply illiberal.
One could make a bit of a Foucauldi-
an empirical remark that imposition 
of behavioral patterns and subtleties of 
pharmacotherapy is long going on in the 
West, but liberal political tradition offers 
a bit more maneuvering space for sub-
jects. Even if the main points of Hux-
ley’s dual ontology are accepted, his so-
lution for evil is too radical, or at least 
not liberal enough for the role of politi-
cal theory Edyvane takes as his starting 
axiom. New age topping does not alter 
the fact that a totalitarian price is paid 
for Palanese annihilation of violence. 
To pay at least some respect to ontolo-
gy that should be informing liberalism – 
free will of the autonomous subject – we 
must, perhaps paradoxically, turn to the 
right side of the ideological spectrum in 
our search for acceptable solutions.
D. Nature and Repression
The idea that human nature is evil, in 
the above mentioned Schmittian sense 
that human beings are dangerous and 
potentially violent, is commonplace in 
literature, alongside with the ideas that 
the social milieu produces violence.15 
15 In his short story Fog from the late forties, 
Boris Vian parodies the stereotypic discour-
ses of Left and Right on violent crime: “‘This 
























What Dostoyevsky hinted becomes 
much worse and explicit in discourses I 
will present here. The idea that nature is 
evil does not only appear among Chris-
tian authors who variate the theme of 
the Original Sin, but also outside of in-
terpretive keys with references to a par-
ticular religious worldview.
A classical place in the first sense is 
William Golding’s Lord of the Flies, the 
allegorical novel from the fifties about a 
group of preadolescent boys who, after a 
plane crash, find themselves on a deso-
late island. From singing kyrie eléison16 
in a well-ordered society (or at least in 
a repressive enough education system), 
where grownups drink tea, discuss and 
solve problems (Golding, 1954: 101), the 
boys end up killing each other as their 
youth my client only knew robbers and as-
sassins, that all his life he had before him an 
example of debauchery and decadence, that 
he gave himself to this life-style and adopted 
it as normal to the extent that he became a 
debauchee, robber and assassin himself, what 
can we conclude?’ The jury was confounded 
by such eloquence, and an old bearded man 
on the extreme right with wise diligence 
watched for an involuntary splutter from the 
floor. But once more the teacher was obliged 
to answer: ‘Nothing’, and blushed. (...) ‘We 
will conclude that submersed in an honor-
able milieu, my client only would have con-
tracted honorable traits. (...)’ (...) ‘But’, con-
cluded the lawyer, ‘what I told you just now 
wasn’t true. My client is of a reputable fami-
ly, has received an excellent education, and 
killed the victim voluntarily and in full con-
science so that he could steal his cigarettes.’ 
‘You are right!’ the jury shouted unanimous-
ly. After deliberation, the murderer was con-
demned to death” (Vian, 1992: 81-82).
16 This liturgical theme appears in the first of 
two adaptations to film, the black and white 
version from the 1960s. Golding’s story be-
longs to the film section as well.
nature takes over. Simon, the Christo-
logical figure, is killed, as well as Piggy, 
an overweight boy with glasses (and the 
sole one with the “abilities of abstract 
thinking”), in the story that intents to 
depict “the darkness of man’s heart” 
(ibid.: 225).
On the other hand, a similar view of 
nature can appear within skeptical and 
ironic frameworks, with clearly secular 
overtones.17 The Fatal Eggs, a short sto-
ry from the twenties written by Mikhail 
Bulgakov, is a good example. In the in-
terpretively rich story, chaos is spawned 
in the society by the work of nature. In 
the biological laboratory experimenting 
with amphibians, a red ray of light is ac-
cidentally discovered by Professor Per-
sikov. The ray makes amoebas, and then 
frogs reproduce at an enormous speed 
and devour each other. In the process, 
the most unscrupulous, most destruc-
tive, or simply most “evil”, prevail.18 
17 The position of the author outside of the ana-
lyzed work, or even outside its smaller dis-
cursive excerpt, is of no importance here. For 
example, Camus may be on “the Left” and 
write essays against the death penalty (Ca-
mus and Koestler, 2002), but his Stranger 
is in that sense fatalistic and apolitical; vio-
lence happens not because of society or a ma-
lignant subject, but in a twist of fate in the 
wider framework of various absurdities of 
existence, perhaps “because of ” the sea (mer) 
and the strong sun (soleil) that come together 
in the main character’s name.
18 Bulgakov’s description of struggle between 
the amoebas has a general air: “In the red 
zone and in the whole plate there was less and 
less room and the inevitable struggle began. 
The newborn attacked, tore to pieces and de-
voured one other. Among the newborn lied 
the corpses of those that died in the struggle 
for survival. The best and the strongest pre-























When politics in the early Soviet Union 
gets interested in the political and social 
potential of the ray, the ray is accidental-
ly used on reptile eggs. The invasion of 
evil reptile mutants almost destroys so-
ciety. They are not defeated by the civil 
guard and the armed forces but, not sur-
prisingly, by the infamous Russian win-
ter, a force of nature itself, which turned 
out to be historically important in curb-
ing various imperial projects. Instead of 
the depth of moral fall, Bulgakov’s sto-
ry presents a cynical view of evolution, 
where its essential impulses of reproduc-
tion and aggression working in humans 
are amplified and shown through a lay-
ered metaphor.
Evil and destruction come natural-
ly. Within these discourses, evil is often 
fatalistically portrayed, endowed with a 
demonic persistence and aesthetic qua-
lities. Beneath the aesthetics, the onto-
logical difference in comparison to the 
position from the earlier sections of this 
essay is that evil essentially comes from 
humans. The arrangement of society is 
irrelevant: evil always manifests itself, 
regardless of the type of society. The se-
cond part of the difference, that consti-
tutes the position on the Right, skeptical 
to any form of belief in social progress 
and social utopianism, is that human evil 
needs fear, sanctions and repression to 
be controlled. In another words, it needs 
strong authority. The vehement version 
of this discourse can be found in Michel 
Houellebecq’s writings. His Elementa-
ry Particles from the late 1990s combine 
evil nature and need for repression. Ado-
lescent boys are explicitly equated with 
animals in the pack. The stronger domi-
tinguished themselves by special wickedness 
and swiftness” (Bulgakov, 2000: 19; translat-
ed from Croatian by K. P.). 
nate the weaker; they brutally beat and 
sexually harass and humiliate them. In 
boarding schools things get worse when, 
in the naïve spirit of the 1960s, the re-
gime of “self-discipline” is introduced. 
The leftist solution that diminishes au-
thority makes things worse:
One or two cruel elements were 
enough to reduce the others to a 
state of savagery. In early adoles-
cence, boys can be particularly sa-
vage; they gang up and are only too 
eager to torture and humiliate the 
weak. Cohen had no illusions about 
the depths to which the human ani-
mal could sink when not constrained 
by law. (...) Unfortunately, a ministe-
rial directive taken after the riots of 
1968 introduced an autodisciplinary 
system in boarding schools and a re-
duction in staffing. The decision was 
very much of its time, and resulted 
in considerable savings in salaries. 
It became easier for pupils to move 
about at night, and soon the bullies 
took to staging raids on the young-
er boys’ dormitories at least once a 
week. They would bring one or two 
victims back to the cinquième dor-
mitory, where the ceremonies would 
begin. (...) For the most part, animal 
societies are structured according to 
a hierarchy in which rank relates di-
rectly to the physical strength of each 
member. The most dominant male 
in the group is known as the alpha 
male, his nearest rival the beta male, 
and so on down to the weakest of the 
group, the omega male (Houellebecq, 
Part I, Ch. 8, “The Omega Male”).
Reduction of staff in the wider ar-
ray of state apparatuses could perhaps 
be understood as a neoliberal measure, 
more to the Right than to the Left on the 
























idea is that weakening of the authority 
and its replacement with different social 
programs is a bad thing to do, one that 
underestimates “evil” in human nature.19 
This position is perhaps too much on the 
Right for Edyvane. Even skeptical misan-
thropy, building political theory on the 
sovereignty of evil, appeals to some de-
cency in political subjects and ascribes 
to them the ability to hope. On the oth-
er hand, paradoxically, the idea that evil 
is natural could be reconciled with Edy-
vane’s framework. The view that human 
nature is evil is combined with the com-
plementary view that aggressive sub-
jects are also driven by a perhaps more 
fundamental drive for self-preservation. 
Since anybody can kill anybody, and the 
final consequence of that spiral of vio-
lence is the state of civil war, where all 
stand against all, than this evil can per-
haps become a sovereign, driving the 
minimal political consensus required by 
Edyvane. It all returns to Hobbes and the 
authority of Leviathan, to the backbone 
of liberalism.20
19 The other possible interpretive accent, stem-
ming from Houellebecq, is that this natu-
ral evil is amplified in specific institution-
al settings such as nursing homes, boarding 
schools and borstals. These places do not lack 
horror stories on violence. This is classically 
explored in Musil’s The Confusions of Young 
Törless (2004). Musil, who as a boy attended 
a military internate in the Austro-Hungari-
an Empire, is of course more sublime and ex-
pressionist in style, but he also vividly por-
trays violence, which has a strong sadistic 
and sexual dimension to it.
20 There is a normative twist to this negative 
view of human nature. Nietzsche affirmed 
its will to power: hate toward nature comes 
from the weak, those who are sick from na-
ture, i.e. who are sick from reality, and seek 
to overthrow it with the ethics of the weak 
E. An Excurse into Film before 
Concluding: German Fables 
vs. Old Testament Justice
The world of cinema offers interest-
ing variations of the portrayed discour-
ses on violence and roots of evil, which 
open further interesting questions to 
Edyvane. A different discursive medi-
um, with its altered angles and shifted 
accents, offers possibilities to continue 
our probing. Perhaps the strongest leftist 
cinematic statement on specifically poli-
tical violence to this day is Costa Gavras’ 
Z from the end of the 1960s. The film 
tells a universal story – with strong and 
intended references to the events pre-
ceding the then actual authoritarian rule 
of the military junta in Greece – about a 
charismatic left-wing politician leading 
a peace movement. In the beginning of 
the film, the politician is killed in riots. 
As the story about the investigation of 
the case develops, seemingly spontane-
ous violence of the right-wing extrem-
ists is exposed as carefully planned. The 
executors are in fact political agents in-
(Nietzsche, 1999: 8, 23-24). And Nietzsche’s 
iconoclasm is pale when compared to de 
Sade’s almost a century older discourse that 
vividly describes brutalities of human nature, 
combining philosophical reflexions with pre-
cise pornographic dissections of orgiastic vi-
olence. For de Sade, the human being is part 
of nature, which is but an eternal series of vi-
olent crimes that the strong perform over the 
weak (de Sade, 2004: 75, 161). In one sense, 
however, that discourse is not revolutionary 
but conservative: perverse enjoyments by 
definition need a normal moral and political 
order to fulfill themselves as transgressions. 
(For the political usage of de Sade as a vehi-
cle of critique of Hobbesian social contract 
theory, and the introduction of the concept 
























strumentalized by the government and 
high-ranking military officials who un-
derstand socialism as “mildew” destroy-
ing the unity of the national body.
Gavras’ position could be subsumed 
under the umbrella of ontology of the 
Left, with a strong critique of national-
ism. In the story, lumpenproletariat and 
madmen act as direct agents of evil. On 
the basis of unofficial political legitima-
tion, military and police training, and 
mandate from the government, they 
execute violence, ultimately helping to 
procreate the inequalities of power in 
an unjust order that could otherwise be 
changed. According to the ontology of 
the Left, social change would reduce the 
causes of violence, but the movie shows 
that it does not happen. The question 
stemming from its portrayal of events 
places challenges to Edyvane on the em-
pirical terrain. Z conveys a universal 
message, but its strong social and his-
torical rootedness – the film is arguably 
a literal description of events in Greece 
from the early 1960s, namely the assas-
sination of Grigoris Lambrakis – tells a 
message of its own. It is hard to cure evil 
if concrete societies are divided. Perhaps 
social change would cut down evil, but 
what is the use if there is no real chance 
for consensus even on sovereign evils, 
since ideological, political, religious, and 
cultural divides in existing societies are 
remarkably deep and entrenched. In Ga-
vras’ perspective, societal evil is perhaps 
essentially different than natural evil. It 
is much worse. But what can be done if 
“socialism” is “mildew” for the strong 
political forces not only in then and to-
day’s Spain, Greece, and perhaps Croatia, 
with the “red” and “black” historical and 
ideological divide entrenched in family 
histories, but in the West in general. Po-
litical theory that seeks to cure evil and 
starts from the consensus building po-
tential of contemporary societies taken 
as they are, could face hard challenges. 
Viewed in that perspective, what are the 
real chances of evil to become our so-
vereign?
As Z shows us, the world of film 
sometimes offers rich and highly stimu-
lating insight into the empirical terrain, 
but perhaps more often, it offers clear-
cut ontological exercises that specula-
tively probe into the nature of violent 
evil. I will limit this section to three ex-
amples. The first sees evil as a conse-
quence of oppressive authority struc-
tures. The second sees evil as the only 
way to fight evil. The final one simply 
sees people as evil, regardless of the so-
ciety. The themes are familiar, but the 
accents are different, and they offer new 
challenges and intriguing questions for 
Edyvane.21 
The action of Michael Haneke’s re-
cent film, The White Ribbon, takes place 
in a small German protestant village 
where various and inexplicable acts of 
21 One should also check Boorman’s films, 
showing violence in the state of nature (De-
liverance) and explicitly connecting violence 
with sexuality (Zardoz). On the other side of 
the ideological spectrum, one should explore 
the subgenre of German cinema of the 2000s 
that speaks of different social experiments 
producing violence: The Experiment, where 
a division of roles between guards and pri-
soners (although in combination with certain 
problematic characters) brings an escalation 
of violence, and The Wave, where the divi-
sion of roles between the leader and the par-
ty members in an experimental class on “au-
tocracy” transforms playful teenagers into a 
hyper-disciplined and fanatic protototalitar-
ian community whose members (again prin-
cipally the ones having character problems) 
























violence take place. The trap is set for 
the doctor: a stretched wire makes him 
fall from his horse and, consequently, 
he is badly injured. The pastor’s budge-
rigar is impaled, and the baron’s son is 
kidnapped and badly beaten. It is sug-
gested that children are responsible for 
the evil deeds, but not as authentic small 
villains like in Golding or Houellebecq. 
Their violence functions as a symptom. 
In other words, Haneke’s point could be 
that children react to the violence of au-
thority structures. The pastor constant-
ly sermonizes on guilt and punishes the 
children harshly for even the smallest 
offences.22 On the other hand, the doc-
tor is an expert in sexual violence. He 
rapes his daughter and abuses his maid, 
who was his mistress already at the time 
when his late wife was alive. The baron, 
the economic ruler of the village, treats 
his workforce badly. They are at constant 
risk of arbitrary firing. The message is 
that violence comes from “hidden” vi-
olence of societal structures: religion, 
family and economy. Since repression 
produces violence, it is a bad recipe for 
curbing violence. Similarly to Haneke’s 
Caché, where this relationship is direct-
ly signified in the title, violence on the 
personal level appears only as a reaction 
to prior hidden violence.23 Since it ends 
22 The title of the movie refers to the symboli-
cally ambivalent and interpretively challeng-
ing fact that the pastor puts white ribbons on 
children’s arms as a sign of their purity, that 
should remind them not to commit any more 
sins.
23 In Caché (Hidden), the bourgeois couple liv-
ing in Paris starts receiving anonymous dis-
turbing tapes, apparently for no reason. It 
turns out that the husband’s moral misdeeds 
from early childhood are probably to blame: 
a jealous child’s manipulation put an Arab 
boy, whose parents died in the 1961 Paris 
with the beginning of the First World 
War, Haneke’s story also serves as a po-
litical metaphor. The oppressed autho-
ritarian generation is the one that later 
provided the popular terrain for politi-
cal legitimation of National Socialism, 
and finally for the horrors of the Second 
World War, arguably the ultimate evil 
in the history of mankind, even if one 
measures evil solely by a simple quan-
titative criterion such as the number of 
deaths.
Haneke’s question for Edyvane is 
where do austerity in the public sector 
and new civic ethics bring us? This on-
tology is much richer than the initial 
Gorky’s story on limited socioeconomic 
roots of violence. Does minimal consen-
sus on the sovereignty of evil leave all the 
evils coming from deeply entrenched 
structures of Western societies intact? 
Does political morality in the liberal 
framework offer too little and come too 
late? We will return to this in the con-
clusion.
The opposite ontology is displayed 
in Sam Peckinpah’s Straw Dogs from the 
early 1970s, another film on violence. 
The role of David, a talented mathema-
tician, is played by Dustin Hoffman. His 
habitus is one of an inhibited stereoty-
pic “nerd” with big glasses. He symbol-
izes politeness and civilization. He ar-
rives in a village in Cornwall with his 
wife, to work on his mathematical equa-
tions in the peace of her small and pic-
turesque birthplace. The local bullies 
soon perceive his weakness, and vio-
lent evil arises. First his cat is killed, then 
his wife is raped. As he defends the vil-
massacre, into an orphanage instead of pos-
sible adoption. The film is an allegory for the 
French colonial guilty consciousness and po-























lage idiot from the drunken mob, a final 
massacre ensues in which David is vic-
torious. Pushed to the edge, his violent 
nature emerges and he defends himself, 
his house and his family. One of the pos-
sible interpretive points is that violence 
can only be constrained by counter-vi-
olence, not by talk, deliberation or nice 
manners. Violence, a natural force, un-
derstands only the language of violence. 
If this animalistic ontology24 is com-
bined with liberal politics, the outcome 
is bleak.
The question is how far does the so-
vereignty of evil allow evil to be used to 
fight and constrain evil? The preceding 
decade provided a controversial exam-
ple: the US foreign policy and military 
operations throughout the world have 
been following Peckinpah’s elementary 
precept, literally dressed in a discourse 
of evil (Petković, 2005). Even the recent 
“State of the Union” addresses employ 
the imagery of danger and darkness, of 
“evil out there”, and use military actions 
as political metaphors for American 
unity.25 Our theme here is not the US fo-
reign policy, which could perhaps better 
be subsumed under Haneke’s chief trope 
of repression producing “evil” (which 
is then personalized and punished to 
24 The titular phrase is taken from the fun-
damental Taoist document Tao Te Ching 
(The Book of Path and Virtue) attributed to 
Laozi. In the 5th song of the book, it is said 
that the universe does not care for “straw 
dogs” (which were symbolically burned and 
stepped over during the public feasts in im-
perial China): Heaven and earth do not act 
from any wish to be benevolent; they deal with 
all things as the dogs of grass are dealt with 
(Laozi, 6th Ct B.C.).
25 Barack Obama, 2012 State of the Union Ad-
dress: Enhanced Version, http://www.you-
tube.com/watch?v=Zgfi7wnGZlE
clear one’s guilty conscience), but Edy-
vane’s liberal political theory. The ques-
tion to him is: does the sovereignty of 
evil mean that political structures may 
and should fight fire with fire? The an-
swer could be that the liberal framework 
allows for conditioned repression as a 
necessary deterrent. N.B. that one pos-
sible Peckinpah’s point is also that if Da-
vid had been firmer and more resolved, 
than the apotheosis of violence wouldn’t 
have taken place: firm and clear, “aus-
tere” rules may sometimes be effective 
and prevent an escalation of evil.
That brings us to the last discursive 
example in this section, where Peckin-
pah’s violent animals are endowed with 
free will and consciousness. Since they 
are turned into morally and political-
ly autonomous subjects, the dire penal 
consequences are justified. In Lars von 
Trier’s early 2000s Dogville, evildoers are 
more than just dogs. The simple scenery 
of the film, as if it were a theatre play, 
strengthens the bare-boned ontologi-
cal message of the plot that tells a story 
about the roots of evil. Grace (played by 
Nicole Kidman) escapes from gangsters 
into a small American town, where she 
is accepted as part of the community.26 
She starts doing good deeds in order to 
be accepted by the town council as a per-
manent resident. Life looks happy until 
Grace is sought by the police twice. The 
town folk feel endangered and Grace is 
requested to do more work for the resi-
dents to redeem herself. She soon turns 
into a victim of oppression. Grace is ex-
ploited, sexually abused and raped. Fi-
nally, she becomes a slave in chains. The 
seemingly caring town intellectual Tom 
26 Although the film is a part of Von Trier’s 
“American Trilogy”, the message is universal, 
























makes a sentimental advance to her 
and is rejected. This hypocritical cow-
ard then becomes the leader of the evil 
flock of torturers and exploiters, “nobly” 
opting for her detention instead of rape. 
When gangsters finally arrive, it turns 
out that the mob leader is Grace’s father. 
Gangsters kill all the residents in what 
seems to be a just retribution. The town 
is burned and Grace kills Tom herself.
One of the possible readings is 
the following: a simple, almost vulgar 
Christian symbolism is at work, as in 
Golding’s story. “Grace” is here to give a 
chance, an escape from the Lord Father, 
who wisely knows that people have to 
be constrained by repression and harsh 
laws; that they have to fear violence so 
as not to inflict it upon one another. The 
more Grace gives to people, the more 
she is abused, until she finally learns the 
true human nature. Since they show no 
remorse after all they have done, she ac-
cepts her father’s vengeance in the well-
-known Old Testament style. The city is 
burned like Sodom and Gomorrah, and 
the only being that survives is the town 
dog – “Moses”. Alongside this Biblical 
layer, there is also an ontology of evil 
at work. In a text on Von Trier’s Dog-
ville, Andrea Brighenti accordingly re-
marks:
The presence of Grace turns out to 
be a significant and even abundant 
economic resource – sexual resour-
ces included. The ragged, ignorant 
inhabitants of Dogville transform 
themselves into slaveholders. Para-
doxically, then, it is not because they 
are poor that they begin to do bad 
deeds – as the philanthropist argues 
– but because they are no longer as 
poor as they used to be (Brighenti, 
2006: 106).
Unlike in Gorky and Haneke, evil 
does not come from society, and it can 
even thrive in an affluent society. On-
tologically postulated freedom implies 
moral and penal responsibility for vio-
lent evildoers. Viewed in that perspec-
tive, the social state paternalism and be-
lief in curing evils through economic 
and social progress turn out to be mis-
guided and arrogant.27 The Old Testa-
ment view of human nature brings Old 
Testament justice.28 If we accept this on-
tology, the question is whether preven-
tive ethics in its social impulses for ame-
lioration would produce greater evil? Of 
course, in its narrower sense, it can ac-
commodate a deterrent view which uses 
the threat of evil to prevent greater evil, 
as both films on the Right, Peckinpah’s 
as well as Von Trier’s, seem to imply.
27 In Von Trier’s controversial Manderlay, also 
a part of his American trilogy, a negative pic-
ture of human nature is paired with skep-
ticism towards democracy that ultimately 
produces more chaos than the authoritari-
an regime of governing, since it allows evil 
natures, now endowed with political rights 
and decision-making opportunities, to fully 
manifest themselves.
28 Von Trier has a negative view of nature. In 
Antichrist, a phantasmagorical fox speaks na-
ture’s motto, congested into words: “Chaos 
reigns!” In an interview for Croatian news-
papers, Von Trier explicitly spoke about such 
an understanding of nature: “When you look 
at how nature works, how life is procreated 
in nature, how there is lots of killing and suf-
fering, I find it hard to accept that God cre-
ated such a world. All that killing and suffer-
ing is such a bad idea” (Nacional, 26th January 
2010, translated from Croatian by K. P.). Lars 
Von Trier became a Catholic when he turned 
30. For a quasi-theological interpretation of 
Antichrist as a film that depicts an alternative 























Conclusion: Will Preventive Morality 
Extract Us from the Gutter?
The time is ripe to sum up how Edy-
vane’s theory looks after our consecutive 
probing into the ontology of evil offered 
by the fictional discourses in literature 
and film, both on the Left and on the 
Right.
Against the ontology of the Left, it 
should survive, at least in its wider con-
ception of curing evils in society pro-
ducing violence (Gorky’s working class), 
while in the narrower sense it could not 
do enough, especially if the problem 
is in faceted repression, not only eco-
nomical but multi-structural, involving 
not only economy, but religion, family 
and gender roles (the more ambitious 
Haneke’s story). Within this ontological 
framework, preventive civic ethics could 
give too little and arrive too late. A nar-
row consensus on sovereign evil could 
lead to reproduction of old sovereign 
evils. Haneke’s White Ribbon discretely 
presages Nazism. Ultimately, he tells us, 
these structures of repression can lead 
to Arendtian total “moral collapse”. It is 
the evil Edyvane notices and – because 
of particularly vile characteristics of the 
project – clearly classifies as sovereign 
evil (Edyvane, 2012: Outline, 5). 
Against nature, as something that 
eschews not only phalanstery (Dos-
toyevsky), but finally all socializing and 
civilizing projects, no politics fares well. 
By virtue of its definition, within this 
ontological framework of evil, nature is 
simply outside of politics’ reach. Since 
the sovereignty of evil cannot practically 
stop all evils, extreme de Sadean natures 
will always perform evil acts outside of 
society’s and politics’ reach, which can 
only react to evil’s consequences. But the 
ontology which says that nature is evil 
and that it can generally be amended 
with a bit of a civilizing repression,29 or 
even fear of evil, could be accommodat-
ed within the framework of Edyvane’s 
ideas. Golding’s boys are not left alone 
to their dark hearts, and neither are their 
modern counterparts in Houellebecq’s 
prose, or Peckinpah’s straw dogs: liberal-
ism offers minimal civilizing potentials 
and protection of “life, liberty and prop-
erty” within the framework of austerity 
and minimal consensus. The backbone 
of Hobbesian liberalism is firm. How-
ever, its limits are in the moral autono-
my of the subject. Sanctions in the Old 
Testament style are perhaps harsh, but 
autonomy and freedom legitimate us-
ing at least some form of evil to respond 
to prior evil. Liberalism must risk evil to 
be done, since it gives its subjects an op-
tion to choose. This is a point that can be 
drawn from Von Trier.
There is another point in liberalism 
having a limited reach in order to pre-
serve the liberty of its subjects. Radi-
cal social engineering in the Huxley-
an sense would possibly eradicate evil, 
but it would also eradicate politics. Pala 
may be a non-violent project, achieving 
a perfect society of happy and conscious 
expanding subjects, but it does so at a 
29 It is quite another story when “natural” vio-
lence is intermingled with a primitive local 
culture of violence. This is explored in Wake 
in Fright, a film by Ted Kotcheff from the ear-
ly seventies, also known as Outback (Kotch-
eff also directed First Blood, a film that fell 
prey to the Rambo franchise). In that film, 
the central character is a teacher who gets 
stuck in Australian outback where people 
drink gallons of bear, play primitive gam-
bling games, take part in drunken brawls and 
in just as drunken kangaroo hunts, shoot-

























totalitarian price. No matter how justi-
fiable from the utilitarian perspective it 
may appear, it is not only deeply illiberal 
to give pills to young Adolph, it would 
kill all politics as well. I guess Han-
nah Arendt would be opposed to that. 
Contemporary Britain isn’t Pala; the 
West isn’t either, and for liberal politi-
cal theorists, it does not need to become 
Pala.
What does that leave us with? It de-
pends on the ontology of evil and the 
precise way we decide to interpret Edy-
vane’s theory. If we accept the ontology 
“of the Right” (nature and civilizing va-
lue of repression) and we say that auste-
rity is socially ambitious enough, then 
evil will continue to thrive; it will not be 
prevented by minimal political consen-
sus in contemporary societies. If it is the 
ontology “of the Left” we accept (socie-
ty and its reform), then Edyvane’s civic 
ethics might not do much, since society 
will continue to produce evils, especially 
if we accept Haneke’s more demanding 
view of multiple repressive structures 
that produce evil. To put it short: is it 
Houellebecq or Haneke, and how much 
and what kind of political intervention 
in society does Edyvane’s position al-
low? Empirically speaking, of course, 
the difficulties in achieving consensus 
remain. If we are faced with a deep ideo-
logical divide and authoritarian struc-
tures that, together with capitalism, pro-
duce class differences, like in Gavras’ Z, 
that could be too much for any civic eth-
ics provided by political theory. Edyvane 
accepts that society is “deeply divided” 
(Edyvane, 2012: Outline, 2). But Z tells 
us it could be too divided. Since mem-
bers of society are “playing wholly dif-
ferent games”, even a “rough consensus” 
could be a hard thing to achieve (ibid.: 
Outline, IV, 6).
Whatever ontology of evil we accept, 
which is finally an empirical question of 
truth about evil in the world (and not of 
fictional discourses that vividly portray 
it), I hope that this essay succeeded in 
showing that discussion on the ontology 
of evil is important. In building a politi-
cal theory of evil, one must take into ac-
count how evil works. In order to effec-
tively cure the consequences, one might 
have to cure the causes that lead to evil. It 
is important to understand evil in order 
to battle it. Edyvane writes that “treat-
ing evil as a political category involves 
focusing less on the issue of its agency 
and more on its harmfulness – less on 
its causes and more on its effects” (ibid.: 
Outline, 4), but that might leave us with 
impoverished political agnosticism. We 
have to know what we are dealing with 
in order to politically act against it. But 
do political liberalism and Edyvane’s un-
derstanding of political theory in that 
context offer a solution for the political 
crisis Edyvane rightly diagnoses?
Society and Nature: A Double Disaster?
I intentionally left the hardest test for 
the end. There is yet another film – cold, 
misanthropical and pessimistic – that 
builds on literature and thus brings our 
two explored mediums, literature and 
film, together. Kubrick’s Clockwork Or-
ange30 from the beginning of the 1970s is 
a dystopia that functions in the present 
30 There is some controversy surrounding dif-
ferent versions of Burgess’ novel. The ear-
ly American version of the book excluded 
the final “metanoia” chapter where the main 
character sees the errors of his ways. Kubrick 
filmed the pessimistic, shorter version, which 
is the natural one to employ in the theoretical 
discussion on politics – a pessimistic activi-
























time as a deeply pessimistic picture of 
contemporary liberal-democratic socie-
ties. It is also a careful fictional exercise 
in the analysis of ontology of violent evil. 
The plot is worth a short recounting.
The main character Alex is the evil 
leader of a gang of wanton youth, not 
deprived in any obvious way. The dys-
topian society is affluent and young evil-
doers come from affluent families. They 
have the opportunity to school them-
selves; they have free time and all the 
possibilities for non-violent self-ful-
fillment. However, they beat, kill and 
rape their fellow citizens. Betrayed by 
his gang co-members (“droogs”), Alex 
gets 14 years in state prison for murder. 
His punishment brings no moral ad-
vance. When the Bible is read in pris-
on, the prisoners burp, thus reminding 
the viewer of Huxley’s observations on 
the impotence of moral education and 
Western penal policies. Alex is then ex-
posed to the Ludovico technique, an ex-
perimental behavioral treatment creat-
ing a conditional reflex that makes the 
subject physically sick when his first vi-
olent impulse awakens. When the effec-
tiveness of the procedure is demonstrat-
ed, the minister of the interior is proud. 
The priest (the one who ineffectively 
reads the Bible in prison) objects to the 
technique on the grounds that it elimi-
nates free will, somewhat similarly to the 
ideas presented in Von Trier’s Dogville – 
or to the ideas of C. S. Lewis, Christian 
apologist and author of The Chronicles of 
Narnia, who in his own time published 
a paper on penal policy in “an obscure 
Australian journal” (Tonry, 2011: 19). 
He opted for (if necessary strict, but) 
transparent punishment, based on mor-
al guilt and criminal responsibility of the 
criminal, and against disciplinary refor-
mation of the subject, which Lewis saw 
as the penal ideal that punishes the in-
nocent, eliminates freedom of choice as 
well as the traditional possibility of mer-
cy, and ultimately rests on some dubious 
“pattern of ‘normality’ hatched in a Vi-
ennese laboratory” (Lewis, 2011: 93).31 
The official response to the priest (and 
to Lewis) is that the government and the 
people are not interested in “subtleties of 
higher ethics”, but that they simply want 
to solve the problem of crime effectively, 
cut it down and reduce the prison po-
pulation.
The Ludovico treatment is deeply il-
liberal – and effective, like Huxley’s Pa-
lanese procedures. After the treatment, 
Alex finds it impossible to be violent and 
as such he becomes the victim of those 
who had feared him and suffered vio-
lence from his hands. Since during the 
treatment Alex unfortunately listened 
31 Cf. early plaidoyer for scientification of pe-
nal policy, i.e. “the systematic assistance of 
psychiatrists, psychologists, and social inves-
tigators”, in: Glueck, 2011: 78. In the world 
of film, the theme of disciplinary oppres-
sion in institutions with nominal purpose to 
cure and reform the subjects is classically ex-
plored in Miloš Forman’s One Flew Over the 
Cuckoo’s Nest, from mid 1970s. Mostly harm-
less patients, subject to different psychiatric 
diagnoses and psychoactive medicines that 
make them numb are terrorized by evil nurse 
Ratched and other staff. In the depressing 
ending, subject who leads the tactical sub-
versions within the institution and under-
mines disciplining authorities is lobotomized 
and thus turned into a human vegetable. The 
film is more of study in disciplinary power 
in Foucauldian sense (Foucault, 1975; 1980; 
1997; Petković, 2010), with subjectless, a-li-
beral ontology of power struggles, which 
uses totally different theoretical language 
than Edyvane and is placed outside of hu-
manistic tradition that more or less informs 
























to the grandiose music of Ludwig Van 
Beethoven, the composer he adores, he 
also developed a behavioral aversion to 
it. Alex is then used as a political weapon 
by the opposition, accusing the govern-
ment of totalitarianism. By the means of 
Beethoven’s music, he is forced to jump 
through a window and then portrayed 
in the press as a victim of the govern-
ment’s oppression. The minister of the 
interior gives him the reverse treatment 
that removes the aversion to violence 
and well-paid sinecure in exchange for 
silence about his case and for not press-
ing charges. Alex’s evil grimace returns. 
He is filled with joy, and in the end he 
claims that he “was cured, all right”.
The film offers anthropological, so-
cietal and political pessimism in por-
traying contours of evil in contemporary 
societies. Man is evil and does evil when 
opportunity arises: Alex was violent, but 
all of his former victims are also violent 
when they encounter him. The home-
less guy, whom Alex and his droogs beat 
up, attacks Alex when he recognizes him 
and sees that he is helpless. Alex’s former 
droogs now work in the police: they also 
beat and torture him to pay him back 
for the beating and domination when he 
was the leader of the group; his former 
bourgeois victims torture him and use 
him for political means. There is no re-
morse and no forgiveness in Clockwork 
Orange, and society and politics do not 
help. Alex’s family is alienated, his par-
ents are afraid of him,32 social work-
ers and probation officers are impotent 
when it comes to leading him to the 
right track. Classical penal policy can-
32 One might argue that Alex’s nature is a pro-
duct of his dysfunctional family, which is in 
turn a product of the alienated industrial so-
ciety.
not reform Alex, while the new scien-
tific one, aside of being illiberal, makes 
mistakes. In Clockwork Orange, even sci-
ence is not to be trusted. Cynical liberal 
democratic politics is not interested in 
following a rational policy course, but 
only in remaining in power, while sensa-
tionalist media seeking scandals go back 
and forth from amplifying the problem 
of violence and praising the program to 
grizzly stories on abuse of human rights 
and totalitarian intrusions of the go-
vernment. On the top stands the culture 
of blasé bourgeois society, the one that 
should provide a societal basis for par-
liamentary liberal democratic politics: 
the homes of the rich are burdened with 
decadence of clothing, strange habitu-
ses of their owners, phallic statues and 
kitschy interior design. The society and 
politics are disastrous, and that does not 
help the burden of human nature.
The final hard question for Edyvane 
is the following: if evil is a cumulative 
product of our societies’ different insti-
tutions and human nature, what can be 
done by dysfunctional liberal democrat-
ic politics and political theory that tries 
to govern it with ideas for civil virtue? If 
things are that bad, then one can (if one 
does not want to summon the cultural 
pessimism of Mel Gibson’s Apocalypto) 
recall Leo Strauss’ (in)famous remark 
that modern political science fiddles 
while Rome burns, but is excused, since 
it does not know that Rome burns and 
it does not know that it fiddles. In oth-
er words, is political theory, constrained 
in the narrow empirical and normative 
framework of the given situation, a po-
litical theory in a straightjacket? Are we 
fiddling together with Edyvane if we 
make evil our sovereign concept, with 
the weak comfort that political theory, 























tical science that ideologically produces 
existing (“burning”) structures wishing 
to scientifically explain them, is at least 
more or less aware that it is fiddling, 
since it perceives the crisis and under-
stands “evil” is the problem?
In the area of human violence and vi-
olent crime I chose to highlight in this 
essay, some authors claim that the con-
servative approach, with the lack of so-
cietal vision and constructive political 
programs, has produced only further 
decadence of society. Instead of aspira-
tional solutions that could lead to deve-
lopment and social progress – this is the 
type of political morality Edyvane puts 
aside – one looks for the problems of the 
existing social order:
Lacking a ‘vision thing’ with which to 
imagine the future and direct society 
the imagination of the political elite 
(indeed of western culture more gen-
erally) has withered and where there 
was previously a sense of possibilities 
and improvement, today’s energy is 
put into attempts at damage limita-
tion and harm reduction. Within 
this more limited mindset the ten-
dency is to shift one’s eyes from the 
horizon and onto the ‘gutter’ to dis-
cover ad nauseam the dangers that 
lurk there (Waiton, 2009: 372).
In the literature on criminal justice 
policy-making, this approach is also 
known as “governing through crime” 
(Simon, 2007), where, instead of build-
ing a better society, many of its essential 
supporting institutions are criminalized, 
i.e. governed with fear of crime and re-
gulated with criminal law (for example, 
schools and families). The consequence 
of this kind of policy-making which al-
ters society is that society falls more 
and more into the “gutter”. The skepti-
cal question could then be: do we want 
to fiddle – govern ourselves through evil 
– as “decadent” liberalism does? Lucki-
ly, there is also a skeptical answer to this 
question, with which I will conclude.
This modest fiddling has been go-
ing on for a long time. It has proven it-
self to be more robust and more success-
ful than other more grandiose political 
orchestras that, instead of utopian mu-
sic, produced the great sovereign evils of 
history. Searching for the minimal con-
sensus on sovereign evil could be politi-
cal liberalism at its best.33 Playing with 
metaphors, Rome could burn for a long 
time. Perhaps the fire will die out one 
day, leaving some buildings intact for us 
to live together and possibilities to build 
new ones. If that happens, it would be a 
big praise for Edyvane’s effort.
33 An alternate take could speak of “liberalism 
with a skeptical face” that, similarly to de-
mocracy in Churchill’s famous adage, turns 
to be the least bad solution, and politically 
survives after all the “epistemological” and 
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Politička etika prevencije i ontologija zla:
nekoliko pouka iz književnosti i filma
SAŽETAK U tekstu se polazi od različitih diskursa o zlu kako bi se ispitala politička teorija 
Dereka Edyvanea koji nastoji izgraditi preventivnu političku etiku koja počiva na konceptu 
“suverenosti zla”. Rasprava se ograničava na specifično “zlo” – nasilje i nasilni zločin – a nje-
govi uzroci, posljedice i indicirana politika koja se s njim mora nositi, zahvaća se terminom 
“ontologija”. Osnovna je ideja u tome da Edyvane mora preciznije odgovoriti na pitanje 
što zlo jest i kako ono funkcionira da bi ga postavio za suverena. Izbjegavanje posljedica 
zla i izgradnja političkog konsenzusa oko velikih zala pretpostavlja razumijevanje njihovih 
uzroka. Metoda istraživanja koja analizira fikciju legitimira se time što Edyvane sam u svo-
jim istraživanjima analizira umjetnička djela i lijepu književnost ali, važnije od toga, time 
što klasični romani i filmovi nose oštar uvid u problematiku i sadržavaju kvalitete što ih 
čine korisnima u fazi istraživanja u kojoj se formuliraju različite hipoteze što ih kasnije tre-
ba testirati. Nakon što se istraže različiti diskursi – koji vide prirodu, društvo, politiku, ili sve 
to zajedno, kao uzrok nasilnog zla, i impliciraju različite ideje za njegovu kontrolu i iskorje-
njivanje – te se Edyvaneova teorija testira u tim diskurzivnim okvirima, dolazi se do provi-
zornog zaključka da je politički liberalizam možda najbolje što do danas imamo.
KLJUČNE RIJEČI Edyvane, zlo, ontologija, politička teorija, politička etika, književnost, film, 
nasilje, zločin
